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COMMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL
TO DISCHARGE PHYSICIAN FROM STAFF AND DENY Him UsE or FACITIES-
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has unanimously held that
while the board of governors of a public (city) hospital can arbitrarily re-
move a duly qualified physician from its appointed medical staff, it cannot,
without due process of law, deny the use of its facilities for the treatment of
such physician's own patients.'
The City Hospital of Fulton, New York, is publicly owned, controlled,
and financed. Section 189 of the City Charter conferred upon its Board of
Governors, the respondents herein:
"Full power . . . to adopt . . . rules, regulations and by-laws for its own
government and for the government, regulation and control of the hospital,
its inmates, and employees .... 112
Pursuant to this authority, the board of governors adopted the following
rules, inter alia:
"Sec. 1: Patients may be treated only by physicians and surgeons who
have submitted proper credentials to the Board of Governors.
Sec. 2: Any physician or surgeon willfully violating any rule or regulation
of the hospital may be denied the use of the hospital."
Physicians and surgeons so privileged to attend patients in the hospital
organized themselves into an active medical staff and adopted the board's
rules, regulations and by-laws. Appointment to the staff was to be made by
the respondent board of governors for a term of one year.
In 1946, Dr. Alpert, a duly qualified physician and surgeon, was ac-
cepted for membership on the hospital's active medical staff and continued
to use its facilities until February 1, 1955. On that date, a determination
of the board of governors excluding Alpert from the use of hospital facilities
and denying him reappointment to the active medical staff, became effective.
No notice, hearing, or any findings of fact preceded such determination.
Alpert thereupon applied for an order pursuant to Article 78 of the
Civil Practice Act,3 annulling the determination of the board. He alleged
that the determination was arbitrary, without foundation in fact, and de-
prived him of property without due process of law. He alleged further that
the nearest other hospital was very distant; therefore, his patients would
have to retain other physicians. Such exclusion would effectively destroy his
practice in an area where he had built his reputation and practice over many
years, representing a subsfantial income and investment.
Respondents' ansWer alleged that the determination was reached only
after careful and mature consideration of a number of facts and circum-
1 Matter of Alpert v. The Board of Governors of the City Hospital of Fulton, 286
App. Div. 542, 145 N. Y. S. 2d 534 (4th Dep't 1955).
2 City Charter of Fulton c. 358, § 189 (1908).
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1283 et seq.
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stances which overwhelmingly justified the board's action. Such facts were
not specified, although an annexed affadavit did aver that the hospital records
contained considerable evidence of mismanagement of medical cases and
willful violation of the by-laws of the medical staff. Though Special Term
granted permission to file an amended answer alleging further facts, the
board elected to rest on its original answer.
Following a trial, Special Term entered an order denying petitioner's
application,4 from which order petitioner appealed. The Appellate Division
in effect reversed the order of Special Term by modifying it so as to permit
Alpert the use of hospital facilities to treat his own patients, although leav-
ing undisturbed the discharge of Alpert from the hospital staff.
The Appellate Division was here concerned with two questions:
(1) whether petitioner had a right to judicial review with respect to either
or both of respondents' acts (the dismissal and the continued exclusion from
the use of the hospital), and, if so, on what grounds; and (2) if petitioner
had a right to such review, what was its scope?
The respondents denied petitioner's right to judicial review, contending
that they, as a public administrative body, had an unlimited discretion in
the management of the hospital, and therefore none of their administrative
acts could be reviewed by the courts. This contention was based on the
provisions of the City Charter which gave respondents "full power" to adopt
rules, regulations and by-laws for the government of their body, and upon
which power there was no express limitation.
The assertion is frequently made that an administrative body possesses
unlimited discretion in its actions, and its acts are not reviewable by the
courts. This is true, as a general proposition, where an act is purely ad-
ministrative, concerned solely with the internal function of the agency. 6
However, where the administrative act is quasi-judicial, rather than purely
administrative, the courts may review.7 An administrative act is quasi-
judicial when "it involves the ascertainment of certain past or present facts
upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined."83
Such rights and liabilities may be created by statute, e.g., the legislative
grant of a fair hearing,9 or by Constitution, e.g., the protection of property
rights and valuable privileges by due process.10 In such cases, the adminis-
trative determination may be reviewed to see if it was repugnant to the
4 Matter of Alpert v. Board of Governors of the City Hospital of Fulton, Un-
reported, Civil No. 7872 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Co., May 3, 1955).
5 See note 1, supra.
6 People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady, 166 N. Y. 44, 59 N. E. 701 (1901).
7 Matter of Hamilton v. Monaghan, 285 App. Div. 692, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 17, 18
(1st Dep't 1955); Schwab v. McElligott, 282 N. Y. 182, 186, 26 N. E. 2d 10, 12 (1940).
8 Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461, 468, 121 N. E. 2d 421, 425 (1954).
9 N. Y. C=-m SERVIcE L. § 22; N. Y. CITY ADm. CoDE § 436-2.0(40). See, also,
Rotkiewicz v. Department of Mental Health, 283 App. Div. 458, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 654
(4th Dep't 1954); Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461, 121 N. E. 2d 421
(1954).
10 Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461, 121 N. E. 2d 421 (1954).
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Constitution, or not within the scope of authority granted to the agency by
the statute, or arbitrary and capricious. 1
As to Alpert's arbitrary removal from the active medical staff, the court
concluded that this official act was not reviewable. It is clear that the direc-
tors of a hospital organized as a private corporation may summarily dismiss
a physician from the staff without notice or hearing,' 2 and it has also been
held that, when dealing' with its own employees, the action of a public ad-
ministrative body in suspending or discharging them is a merely adminis-
trative function, and no notice or hearing is necessary unless specifically
required by statute.' 3 In the present case, the City Charter gave respondents
"full power" to adopt their own rules. There was no express limitation upon
that power; the statute did not provide for a hearing.
Nor did Alpert have any constitutional right to enforce in this connec-
tion. It has been held that a license to drive a taxi, being of great value to
the licensee, who may not carry on his business or occupation without it, may
not be taken away except by due process of law.' 4 However, the court in
this case distinguished a licensee from an appointee or employee and in-
dicated that, unless enjoined by statute, the administrative body could
suspend or discharge its own employees without a hearing. Thus, the present
court concluded that Alpert had "no right to represent the hospital and
treat patients who have not engaged his services."' 15
In no sense, then, can the dismissal of petitioner be considered a quasi-
judicial act; such act was purely administrative, and related to the internal
functioning of the agency. This seems to be the majority American rule,18
although a Wisconsin court has recently held that an indefinite suspension
of a duly licensed physician from the active staff of a municipal hospital is
unreasonable unless a provision is made for fair notice and an opportunity
to be heard.'
7
Turning to the respondents' denial of the use of hospital facilities for
the treatment of petitioner's own patients, the court reached an opposite
conclusion. While it is true that there was no express statutory limitation
upon the respondents' power to exclude the petitioner from all contact with
the hospital, the court in Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan'8 indicated that such
a limitation would be implied where the exercise of the statutory power
adversely affects property rights. In the present case, petitioner had practiced
in the city for seventeen years and enjoyed the use of hospital facilities for
nine of them, and so had developed a large practice representing a substantial
11 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Illinois Central Ry., 215 U. S. 452, 30 S. Ct.
155, 54 L. Ed. 280 (1910).
12 Van Campen v. Olean General Hospital, 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N. Y. Supp. 554
(4th Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 239 N. Y. 615, 147 N. E. 219 (1925).
13 People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady, 166 N. Y. 44, 59 N. E. 701 (1901).
14 See note 10, supra.
15- See note 1, supra at 546, 145 N. Y. S. 2d at 539.
16 54 A. L. R. 852 N (1951).
17 Johnson v. City of Ripon, 359 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. 2d 1928 (1951).
18 See note 10, supra.
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income and investment. Due to the distance of the next nearest hospital, and
the fact that patients would, in the event of hospitalization, have to engage
other physicians, petitioner's exclusion from the hospital for the treatment
of his own patients would effectively destroy a species of tenure that cannot
be arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably destroyed. Such tenure is a valu-
able privilege.
While in a certain sense, as the United States Supreme Court has held,
there is no constitutional right to practice medicine in a public hospital,19
yet valuable privileges, as well as rights, are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. Thus, a state license which is of value to the individual holding it may
not be taken away except by due process of law, whether it is a license to
operate an auto,20 to drive a hack or taxicab,21 or to purchase, handle or
distribute fluid milk. 
2
Thus, although there was no express statutory requirement that re-
spondent give notice and a hearing before excluding petitioner from treat-
ing his own patients in the hospital, such a requirement is implied when
property rights are effected.2 3 And although there is no right to practice
medicine in a municipal hospital,24 the facts of this case create for petitioner
a valuable privilege which the court held was also entitled to the constitu-
tional protection of due process. Since, therefore, petitioner had the right
to due process, the act of respondents in excluding him from the hospital
was a quasi-judicial act, subject to judicial review.
Having established the doctor's right to a judicial review, the court
proceeded to an examination of the board's determination. The first wrong
which an administrative body can commit is to adopt unreasonable rules.
Such rules must be reasonable and "consonant with the purposes of the insti-
tution for which they were made.1 25 Here, the rule was that "any physician
or surgeon willfully violating any rule or regulation of the hospital may be
denied the use of the hospital." Such rule, the court held, was reasonable.
The second wrong which the administrative body can commit is to enforce
the rules without regard to the requisites of due process of law. In this case,
although the creating statute, the City Charter, did not impose the necessity
of due process upon the hospital, "where the exercise of a statutory duty
adversely affects property rights, the courts have implied the requirement
of notice and hearing where the statute was silent.128 Here, property rights
were adversely affected, and thus the provision for due process would be
implied. Because respondents refused to aver any facts in their answer as to
the basis for their action, the court had to presume that their conduct was
19 Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U. S. 414, 47 S. Ct. 363, 71 L. Ed. 714 (1927).
20 Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435, 103 N. E. 2d 728 (1952).
21 See note 10, supra.
22 Elite Dairy Products v. Ten Eyck, 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. 2d 616 (1936).
23 See note 10, supra.
24See note 19, supra.
25 People ex rel. Croft v. Manhattan State Hospital, 5 App. Div. 249, 253, 39 N. Y.
Supp. 158, 161 (1st Dep't 1896).
20 See note 10, supra at 468, 121 N. E. 2d 421, 424.
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arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious, and disregarded the requirements of
due process. 27 In addition, the court pointed to the public nature of the
hospital involved, and from this further implied a limitation upon the discre-
tion of the board of governors to restrict arbitrarily the use of the hospital
by the public, whether physician or patient. Therefore, the court reversed
Special Term's order denying petitioner's application for an order to annul
the hospital board's determination, to the extent that it excluded petitioner
from the hospital for the treatment of his own patients.
This case is illustrative of the legal administrative problems which the
growth of public hospitals brings. The public nature of the hospital, suggests
the court, implies a limitation upon administrative power, and a consequent
necessity for the balance of interests. Also, the present case adds further
weight to that growing body of law which has extended constitutional protec-
tion to valuable privileges which are not in themselves entitled to the protec-
tion accorded to vested rights.
27 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1295.
